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Abstract:  We propose and solve a simple model of firm-level 
decisions to offshore production stages of lower skill intensity than 
that of activities that remain in the domestic location. In theory, 
offshoring is optimal only for the more productive among 
heterogeneous firms if it entails a fixed cost. In a large sample of 
Italian firms, offshoring - especially of intermediate production 
stages - is indeed more prevalent among firms that are larger and 
more productive, and  is predicted by arguably relevant firm-level 
characteristics.  We also document that offshoring decreases the 
share of unskilled employment in domestic production facilities as 
well as firms’ propensity to employ immigrant workers, and we 
discuss the possible determinants and policy implication of the 
latter finding. 
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Offshoring of production to low-wage countries is often blamed for job destruction and 
immigrant inflows also appear to threaten the employment opportunities of unskilled workers in 
rich countries. The causes of these phenomena and the policy reactions motivated by 
employment and wage concerns are tightly related (as discussed in e.g. Jones, 2005). 
Liberalization of trade in goods triggers relocation of production from advanced to less 
developed countries if foreign labor costs are low. But the extent to which foreign wages fall 
short of domestic ones also affects migration incentives, and reflects obstacles to migration 
flows.  If immigration affects domestic wages and employment (as discussed in Borjas 2003,  
Ottaviano and Peri 2005 and 2006 and in Peri and Sparber 2007) , it also influences the 
attractiveness of offshoring options, and the viability of manufacturing production in developed 
countries. 
This paper takes empirical and theoretical steps towards a better understanding of firm-
level links within this intricate set of interactions. A survey of Italian manufacturing firms makes 
it possible to assess firm-level relationships between the size and skill intensity of employment, 
size and productivity, the share of foreign born workers and offshoring decisions. The 
descriptive statistics we examine in Section 2 indicate that only some firms offshore production, 
that these firms are larger and more efficient, and that they employ a larger share of white-collar 
workers and relatively fewer foreign-born workers. While immigrant employment and offshoring 
tend to correlate positively across Italian provinces, clustering in those where manufacturing 
activity is strong, the firm-level negative relationship between the two indicators and   
discreteness and heterogeneity of individual choices observed in the data suggest a modeling 
perspective focused on firms. Within this perspective it is possible to analyze how  firm-specific 
sources of competitiveness determine choices between configurations characterized by different 
marginal and fixed costs, like domestic and foreign production.  
In Section 3 we specify a model of firm-level decisions to offshore portions of the 
production process. We adapt to the purpose insights drawn from the recent literature focused on 
the role of unobserved competitiveness in shaping heterogeneous firms’ international activities. 
Our model adopts many ingredients of key contributions to this literature, briefly reviewed 
below, and extends it to characterize the skill composition of employment as well as of the size 
distribution of firms in terms of sales and of employment. Since offshoring entails a fixed cost, it 
  2is optimal only for highly productive (hence larger) firms. And to the extent that offshoring is 
meant to take advantage of different wage structures in domestic and foreign locations, it should 
be associated with differences in the skill intensity of domestic employment.   
Section 4 confronts these theoretical implications with the data. Controlled regressions 
confirm that firms that do offshore some of their production activities have a larger share of 
skilled personnel in their remaining home activities. The data also indicate that such firms 
employ relatively few immigrant workers. Our modeling perspective can explain such evidence 
if the share of unskilled workers is larger among immigrants than among natives, as is realistic in 
Italy (see Murat and Paba, 2004).  We find that offshoring is empirically related to employment 
of immigrants even after controlling for firm-level employment’s skill composition. This could 
be so because the skills of migrants differ from the skills of local workers along more detailed 
dimensions than that of the rough indicators (white and blue collars) available in standard data. 
Indeed, recent works on the US show that even among low skilled workers, specific tasks require 
different sets of skills and that immigrant workers tend to specialize in manual tasks rather than 
in interactive and language intensive ones (Peri and Sparber, 2007).  
Section 5 concludes reviewing how our firm-level results bear on more general 
interactions between offshoring and immigration. Evidence of a negative relationship between 
hiring of migrant workers and offshoring at the firm level has potentially important implications 
for the interaction between policies ruling migration flows and affecting firms’ competitiveness 
and the incentive to offshore. Restrictions to the inflow of unskilled migrants not only increase 
incentives to offshore, but also jeopardize the profitability of firms that are unwilling to pursue 
the offshoring option and require unskilled workers at home.  Symmetrically, recent calls in 
Europe and in the US for measures penalizing firms that offshore production may deprive 
domestic industries firms of an important strategic option, slow down the pace of transition of 
manufacturing towards high value added activities, and increase the demand for unskilled 
migrant workers.    
 
1.2. Related literature 
Much has been written on the impact of offshoring and other forms of internationalization on the 
relative demand for skills. In a representative-firm Hecksher-Ohlin framework, Helpman (1984), 
  3Helpman and Krugman (1985), Feenstra and Hanson (1996) show that fragmentation leads to an 
increase in the relative demand for skills and in wage differentials in the North. Many empirical 
studies have tried to estimate these effects on data where the wage gap between skilled and 
unskilled workers in advanced countries grows in parallel with flows of imports of manufactured 
products from developing countries. This literature generally measures offshoring either on the 
basis of input-output tables or of trade data (by looking at intraindustry trade) or by combining 
the two. Some consider the aggregate of all imported inputs; others distinguish between inputs 
originating from developing countries and from industrialized countries. Usually, a translog cost 
function specification is estimated, adding measures of offshoring and of technical change or 
R&D investment to control for the effect of skilled biased technical change on the skilled-labor 
cost share. Feenstra and Hanson (1996a, 1996b and 1999) and many follow-up studies on US 
data find evidence of a role for offshoring that is sizable, if not as important as that of technical 
change, in determining increases in the wage share of skilled workers.
1   
We build on a recent highly influential strand of literature, reviewed in Helpman (2006), 
which studies the role of heterogeneous firm-level competitiveness in shaping international 
activities. Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) focus on the choice of the 
output market (home vs. foreign) and of how to serve it (exports vs. FDI);  Antras and Helpman  
(2004) on the choice of where to source inputs (inshoring vs. offshoring) and how (insourcing vs. 
outsourcing); Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2006) explore the joint choice of both 
internationalization patterns. In the equilibrium of these and other models, only the more 
productive firms find it optimal to engage in international activities entailing a fixed cost.
2  Our 
main focus is on the choice to offshore part of the production process to a foreign country. We 
model the choice in terms of a tradeoff between lower production costs in  the foreign location 
and the cost of coordinating fragmented production (see Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Jones and 
Kierzkovski, 1990; Jones, 2005 for discussions of the structure of such costs).  
                                                 
1 Slaughter (2000) is also on the US; Ekholm and Hakkala (2005) on Sweden; Egger and Egger (2003) on Austria; 
Anderton and Brenton (1998) and Hijen, Gorg and Hine (2005) on the UK;  Helg and Tajoli (2005), on Italy and 
Germany; Falk and Koebel (2002) also on Germany and Strauss-Khan (2003) on France. Amiti and Wei (2005a,b) 
on the US and the UK look at the effects on total labor demand and productivity of service offshoring; Egger and 
Egger (2006) examine the effects on the productivity of low skill workers.  
2 In other models heterogeneity in the access into the export market is not driven by fixed costs. Bernard, Eaton 
Jensen and Kortum (2002) obtain heterogeneity in the decision to export by assuming a model of Bertrand 
competition and Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) by using linear demand systems across a continuum of varieties. 
  4We disregard organizational choices and assume a single integrated output market, in 
order to focus on the impact of offshoring on the level and skill composition of employment in 
domestic plants.
3 Yeaple (2005) similarly aims at characterizing the interaction between 
international activities and domestic employment, in the presence of firm and/or worker 
heterogeneity. We focus on imperfect substitutability across different type of labor, however, 
while Yeaple models worker heterogeneity in terms of efficiency units and shows that firms 
engaged in international activities endogenously employ more sophisticated technologies and 
more productive workers.  
Our empirical analysis focuses on relationships between offshoring and the demand for 
skills at the firm level, rather than at the industry level. Few earlier papers exploit firm or plant 
specific evidence and, to the best of our knowledge, none specifically relates a broad measure of 
offshoring to the structure of the work force. Gorg and Hanley (2004) examine the effect on total 
labor demand for a sample of Irish plants by estimating a dynamic employment equation where 
offshoring (measured by imported intermediates) is introduced as a demand shifter. They find 
that offshoring has a negative effect on short term plant-level labor demand. Head and Ries 
(2002) and Hansson (2005) consider more directly the effects on the skill composition of the 
labor force, for Japan and Sweden respectively. But these studies are based on the activities of 
multinational firms. Measuring offshoring as the size of the foreign activities and estimating 
short run labor demand derived from translog cost functions, both studies find that the skill 
intensity of home activities increases with the share of foreign activities carried out in labor 
intensive countries.   
The focus of this paper on skill intensity also makes it possible to characterize the link 
between offshoring and employment of migrant workers, insofar as it is related to the skill 
structure of the firm.  The relevant literature has mostly focused on whether migrant flows and 
FDI are substitute or complements for a given location (country, province, region etc.) or pair of 
locations and has not looked at this link within firms. Some among these studies are Murat and 
Paba (2004) on Italy,  Buch  et al (2005) on Germany, Kirkegard (2005) on outsourcing of 
                                                 
3 Other theoretical contributions analyze the link between offshoring and the demand for skills in representative-firm 
settings. See Jones and Kierzkowsky (1990) and Jones (2005). Egger and Egger (2003) also examine whether the 
effect is different under a competitive or a unionized labour market for unskilled workers. Markusen (2006) also 
studies how standard theories of international trade and FDI can explain the effects of the off-shoring of high skilled 
services. 
  5services and immigration in the US, Aroca and Maloney (2005) on Mexico. Empirically, the 
inflow of migrants in a given location is typically found to be related to a reduction of outward 
investment or even an increase in inward investment. Such substitutability may be explained by 
factor cost effects within a standard Hecksher Ohlin model with competitive markets and no 
frictions, or brain drain factors driven by the complementarity between human capital and 
investment, or networking effects as migrants attract investment to their country of residence 
from their country of origin (although Kugler and Rapoport (2005) and Docquier and Lodigiani 
(2006) show that networking effects may also work in the opposite direction). Alternatively it 
could simply be driven by other variables like the size of markets and cultural and geographical 
proximity, which are factors of attraction for both FDI and migration flows. 
 
2. Data and descriptive statistics 
We analyze the Capitalia survey of 4289 Italian manufacturing firms, carried out in 2004 with 
current and retrospective yearly information for 2001-2003.
4 Like the earlier waves of a long-
running series of similar surveys, the dataset includes all Italian firms with more than 500 
employees as well as a representative sample of smaller firms, stratified on geographical area, 
industry, and size. Besides standard firm specific variables, including balance sheet entries, the 
data also report detailed information on international activities. As regards the relationship 
between internationalization and firm characteristics, the data appear to conform to similar 
datasets from other countries. Benfratello and Razzolini (2007), for example, find that larger and 
more productive firms are more likely to export some of their production and to produce abroad 
in order to serve foreign markets. Crucially for our purposes, the survey features additional detail 
as to the size and purpose of each firm’s foreign operations, including information as to whether 
foreign operations are meant to supply intermediate parts, and data on the composition of 
domestic employment include the percentage of foreign workers.  
                                                 
4 In the empirical analysis we excluded form the sample firms with incomplete information or with extreme 
observations for the variables of interest. The Data Appendix outlines the sample selection procedure in detail. 
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The distributions of sales, valued added, and employment is heavily skewed, and the ratios of 
sales and value added to total employment are very heterogeneous across firms. Skill levels are 
also highly heterogeneous across firms: the interquartile range of white-collar employees as a 
ratio of total employment is in the order of 20 percentage points.
5 Finally, and very importantly 
for our purposes, we see, still in Table 1, that foreign workers are a rather small fraction of total 
employment (3.8% on average) but are highly dispersed across firms. While more than 50% of 
surveyed firms report no foreign employees, we see that 25% of the observations report at least 
4.3% foreign employment (and 10% of the firms report a share higher than 10 percent).  
We will be interested in exploring the relationship of these dimensions of heterogeneity 
to each other, and to firm-specific indicators of activity offshoring and labor force composition. 
Roughly 7.5% of the firms report that some of the production included in sales occurs in other 
countries; among these, 38% state that offshored production accounts for less than 10% of sales, 
43% that it accounts for between 10 and 50%, and 19% that it accounts for over half of sales.  
Not all offshoring is alike. Using input-output information, Daveri and Jona-Lasinio 
(2007) detect sizable differences in the association with productivity of offshoring of 
intermediates rather than services. The survey we analyze elicits information as to the motivation 
and destination of international production activities. Among firms that do offshore some 
activities, 72% state that lower labor costs as one of the two  main reasons for doing so, and 
another 35% cite the need to avoid being priced out of the output market; only 22% view 
offshoring as a way to reduce costs of foreign market penetration. Romania is the destination 
country for 31% of the offshoring firms, China is the next most frequent at 21.5%, and virtually 
all countries mentioned in the survey as offshoring destinations are at much lower levels of 
development than Italy. 
 
We define a dummy taking the value one when some offshoring activity is observed, and 
refer to such observations as ‘offshoring firms.’ Among such firms, we single out those that 
indicate both that the portion of their sales that is produced abroad includes intermediates (thus 
                                                 
5 Another survey question refers to the number of specialized (plant managers and technicians) blue-collar 
employees. These are rather often reported to be absent or to coincide with total blue-collar workers, which may 
spuriously reflect survey respondents’ inability or unwillingness to provide more precise information. , Indicators 
based on this variable proved uninformative when used alongside or in place of the standard white/blue collar 
distinction in regressions such as those reported below.  
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market proximity considerations rather than by production cost savings) and that some of their 
offshoring activities are re-imported. We refer to these as the ‘restricted sample’ of offshoring 
firms. As we shall see, these are slightly more different from non-offshoring firms in ways 
consistent with the modeling perspective we propose below.  
Table 2 displays the main descriptive statistics separately for non-offshoring firms and 
for offshoring firms. On average, relative to other firms, offshoring firms are about three times 
larger in terms of sales and less than three times larger in terms of employment. Sales per 
employee are some 15% higher. This is to a large extent an obvious reflection of the fact that 
sales include production performed by the employees of foreign plants, on which we have no 
information. More interestingly, the value added per employee of offshoring firms is some 2% 
higher than that of non-offshoring firms, and the former employ a much larger share of white 
collar workers.
6 Offshoring firms also employ fewer extra-EU workers. All such differences  are 
larger if the comparison focuses on a “restricted sample” of firms that offshore only a portion of 
their manufacturing process and therefore perform in their domestic plants at least some 
variable-cost production activities. 
Availability of both immigrant employment and offshoring information offers a rare 
opportunity to assess empirically the relationship between the two phenomena. Our analysis will 
be focused on firm-level information, but will need to account and control for market-level 
interactions. To document the importance of those interactions, Table 3 reports the results of 
descriptive regressions of the offshoring dummy and of firm-level foreign employment share on 
a province-specific indicator of industrial ‘competitiveness’: the share of manufacturing 
employment on total employment. That indicator, the incidence of offshoring, and employment 
of immigrants are positively and very significantly correlated, suggesting that province-level 
factors play an important role in shaping labor cost considerations and immigration incentives
7.  
                                                 
6 The skill composition of the domestic labor force of offshoring firms may well be a reason why offshoring of 
manufacturing activities is associated with higher productivity of (not quality adjusted) labor, and why this is not the 
case when offshoring of services can be singled out (Daveri and Jona-Lasinio, 2007): services are likely performed 
by high value-added white-collar workers within manufacturing firms, and measured productivity will tend to be 
lower when such activities are performed elsewhere. 
7 Regional and firm level outcomes can be reconciled in intuitive terms. If efficiency triggers the choice of 
offshoring, in regions with a strong concentration of highly competitive firms there will be a larger share of them 
producing abroad. At the same time average wages will be higher and attract more migrants. However, for given 
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3. Production offshoring by heterogeneous firms 
While the regional patterns documented in Table 3 indicate that stronger manufacturing 
industries are associated with more intense offshoring and immigration, firm-level evidence, 
indicate the potential relevance of exogenously heterogeneous competitiveness in determining 
both firm-level and market-level outcomes. The descriptive evidence of Table 2 is consistent 
with a data-generating mechanism that associates higher efficiency and stronger skill intensity to 
firm-level offshoring decision.  
We proceed to formulate a model of firm-level decisions that delivers the two 
implications on the basis of economically sensible assumptions. First, we show that sorting of 
highly productive firms into offshoring can be explained if the reorganization of production 
needed to take advantage of lower marginal costs in foreign locations entails fixed costs. Second, 
we show that different skill intensities across the domestic activities of offshoring and non-
offshoring firms are a natural consequence of foreign locations’ comparative advantage in low-
skill activities. In the next section we discuss how this may bear on the evidence, especially as 
regards employment of immigrant workers. 
 
3.1 Firm–level heterogeneity and offshoring 
As pointed out by Melitz (2003), a firm’s intrinsic efficiency bears on its choice across 
production and sales modes with different fixed and marginal cost and benefits. In Melitz’s 
original contribution, more efficient firms are better able to take advantage of market access, and 
more inclined to bear the fixed cost of equipping themselves to export.  In this paper’s context 
offshoring is more attractive for stronger firms if, at the same time as it makes it possible to tap 
into cheaper labor pool and decrease marginal costs, it entails higher fixed costs. Substantial 
fixed costs may in fact be entailed not only by foreign direct investment in wholly owned plants, 
but also by the negotiations and know-how required by arms-length outsourcing relationships. 
This implies that, among   heterogeneous firms within an industry, the more productive ones will 
select themselves into offshoring. We suppose that offshoring costs are the same for all firms, 
                                                                                                                                                             
local conditions,  only highly productive firms will offshore and these will employ relatively more skilled workers 
and implicitly less migrants. 
  9and disregard the distinction between “insourcing” or “outsourcing” arrangements for production 
relocation.  
To focus on international factor cost differences as the driving force of the offshoring 




− = ay y p , where  1 > σ ,   is an index of demand strength, and   denotes the firm’s total 
production independently of where its plants are located. This means that offshoring decisions 
are not based on product market considerations, such as foreign market penetration. The 
demand-strength parameter a, to which we will occasionally refer as ‘competitiveness’ for 
brevity, may depend on the stage of the firm’s product’s cycle or other firm-specific market-
position phenomena. For a given firm, however, it is independent of the production process and 
location, because output is sold on an integrated world market or is transported back to the firm’s 
specific national market.  
a y
Production costs (net of transport costs) may instead be affected by offshoring if factor 
prices are different across locations. Postponing to the next subsection an explicit model of 
marginal cost determination, we suppose production costs to be linear in production and proceed 
to characterize how profit-maximizing firms with revenue function 
σ
1 1 ) (
− = ay y yp  choose the 
location and level of production if marginal and fixed costs depend on whether production is 
wholly domestic or is partly offshored.
8
Let marginal cost c(oi) be independent of scale, but take different values depending on 
whether firm i offshores part of its production activities (indicated by oi=1) or performs all of it 
domestically (oi=0). And let the firm’s fixed cost of production f(oi, mi) similarly depend on the 
offshoring vs. domestic production choice, as well as on other firm-specific factors indexed by 
mi. 
Within each production regime , maximization of profits  i o
] ) , ( ) , ( [ ) , (
1 1





i iy a ,  be equal to marginal cost      times the mark up factor  ) ( i o c ) 1 /( − σ σ . 
                                                 
8 This functional specification represents monopolistically competitive firms producing differentiated goods, but can 
also be reinterpreted in terms of decreasing returns to production at the level of the firm. 
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To decide whether to offshore, the firm compares maximized profit levels 























across the wholly domestic (oi=0) and partly offshored (oi=1) configurations of its production 
process.
9  Offshoring is optimal for a given firm if the unit cost difference implies a large enough 
operating profit difference to cover the fixed cost difference, 
() () ( ) )) , 0 ( ) , 1 ( ( 1 ) 0 ( ) 1 (
1 1 1
i i i m f m f c c a − − > −
− − − σ σ σ σ σ σ σ  , 
i.e. if  a   is so large that the additional profits from lower marginal cost at least cover the fixed 
cost difference.  
i
Hence, the model predicts that among firms with similar cost structures but 
heterogeneous competitiveness offshoring is only observed by firms whose   exceed a critical 
level  
i a
() ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] [ ] σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ / ) 0 ( ) 1 ( ln )) , 0 ( ) , 1 ( ( 1 ln exp
1 1 1 − − − − − − − = c c m f m f a i i ,                     (2) 
which depends intuitively on offshoring’s impact on fixed and marginal costs. We model next 
how technology and labor costs bear on these aspects of the firm’s cost structure.  
 
3.2 Offshoring and the skill intensity of production 
To model the relationship between the firm’s offshoring choices and costs, we suppose that 
production involves two distinct stages, dubbed ‘components’ and ‘assembly’ in what follows. 
We make the simple definitional assumption that production of a unit of final output requires 
components and assembly activities in fixed proportions. But we allow each of the two stages of 
production to use skilled and unskilled labor in flexible proportions, and we allow wages of 
effectively equivalent labor to differ across locations (because barriers to migration and trade 
prevent factor price equalization). 
                                                 
9 If the strength indicator a is so low as to imply that profits are negative for both offshoring choices, then the  firm 
should shut down.  
  11Adopting Cobb-Douglas functional forms, let x  units of skilled labor and z units of 
unskilled labor produce the components of    units of output. If a unit of skilled labor 
costs  s  and a unit of unskilled labor costs u, a cost-minimizing firm therefore uses 
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We similarly suppose that the production function   implies employment of   
α α − 1 z Ax
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1 1   unskilled workers to assemble a unit of 
output. The marginal cost of assembly activities is therefore given, as a function of wages, by an 
expression similar to that of equation (3), in terms of A and α rather than G and γ.  
Wage rates,  , differ not only across the skill levels (p=s  or  u, for skilled and 
unskilled) but also across the possible locations (j=d  or  f, for domestic and foreign) of the 
workers engaged in producing the firm’s output. Our functional form and wage structure 
assumptions imply that marginal cost can be expressed, as a function  of 
domestic and foreign skilled and unskilled wages, and of the offshoring indicator o
pj w
) , , , , ( i uf sf ud sd o w w w w c
i (equal to 1 if 
the firm offshores some of its production,  to zero if it performs it all domestically):  
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if assembly takes place offshore. 
If offshoring entails higher fixed costs, in order to be potentially optimal it must imply 
lower marginal cost. Imposing that ranking on the marginal cost expressions requires that the 
wage of effective labor abroad should be sufficiently lower than domestic wages to satisfy the 
condition   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
α α α α − − <
1 1
ud sd uf sf w w w w .                                          (4) 
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according to equation (1). The effects of offshoring on output and employment are interestingly 
different. For a given firm, offshoring is associated with larger output inasmuch as it decreases 
marginal cost; it has ambiguous implications for domestic employment, however, because while 
relocation of “assembly” lowers the local labor input requirement of each unit of final output, as 
more output is produced employment may increase in the “components” activity that remains 
domestic.  
The implications for the composition of employment are however unambiguous if, as is 
realistic, the “assembly” production activities that may be performed offshore have lower skill 
intensity (  γ α <  ). We illustrate and elaborate on these results in the next subsection. 
 
3.3 Observable implications 
Figure 1 illustrates firm-level relationships between ‘competitiveness’, employment, and 
offshoring. The plots report (as dashed and dotted lines) theoretical relationships conditional on 
whether production is offshored or not. The circles refer to a sample of firms drawn from a 
lognormal distribution of competitiveness a (measured on the horizontal axis of panels A and C 
in the figure; to improve legibility, a small amount of unrelated noise is added to the variables 
implied by each draw of a). The firms that offshore production are those whose a draw is larger 
than the threshold defined in equation (2). Since offshoring entails a fixed cost and the 
parameters satisfy condition (4), offshoring firms have lower marginal costs and, as shown in 
panel A of Figure 1, are unambiguously larger in terms of production and sales: the selection into 
offshoring of exogenously more competitive firms reinforces the positive association between 
offshoring and production levels induced by the lower marginal cost of offshored production.  
Panel C illustrates the implications of offshoring outcomes for firms’ domestic 
employment levels. Since the lower marginal cost of an offshoring firm increases production at 
the same time as it decreases its domestic labor requirements, offshoring is in general 
ambiguously related to domestic employment. For the parameters used in plotting the Figure, we 
see in panel C that at a given level of exogenous competitiveness a offshoring reduces the size of 
firms in terms of employment: it increases their size in terms of sales in panel A, but not by 
enough to offset the lower domestic labor requirement of offshored production. But even after 
  13the parameters have pinned down a negative impact of offshoring for a given firm’s size, the 
model yields an interestingly ambiguous cross-sectional association between employment levels 
and the actual, endogenous offshoring choices of heterogeneous firms. Since more competitive 
(and likely larger) firms selected into offshoring by fixed costs, in panel C the more competitive 
non-offshoring firms are larger in terms of employment than the least competitive offshoring 
firms.  
As to the observable implications of firm heterogeneity and offshoring choices, we see in 
panel B of Figure 1 that offshoring firms are larger in terms of sales, but not necessarily in terms 
of domestic employment, and quite intuitively display higher sales/worker ratios. In reality as in 
the model, only some of the firms that operate in a given labor and product market offshore 
production. The model interprets these outcomes in terms of heterogeneous firm-level efficiency 
or ‘competitiveness,’ and predicts that firms that offshore a portion of their production activities 
should be larger in terms of output and sales but may or may not be larger in terms of local 
employment. 
Figure 2 is of particular interest to our purpose. It illustrates the more detailed and 
informative implications of our model for the relationship between offshoring, firm size, and 
skill intensity. Its panel A again illustrates the basic mechanism whereby the structure of fixed 
cost and marginal costs implies that offshoring firms produce and sell more than non-offshoring 
ones. The other three panels of Figure 2 illustrate the implications of the model’s explicit 
treatment not only of the cost, but also of the skill structure of employment. For the parameters 
used in plotting the figures, the ‘assembly’ activities candidates for offshoring are much more 
unskilled-labor intensive than the ‘components’ activities that are always performed in the firm’s 
domestic plant. Thus, in panel C the heterogeneous ‘competitiveness’ indicator a is related to 
unskilled employment (circles refer to firm specific observations of unskilled employment)  in 
very different ways across offshoring and non-offshoring firms: for given a offshoring implies 
much lower unskilled employment, but it actually implies a higher level of skilled employment 
(plus signs refer to firm specific observations of skilled employment), because component 
production is sufficiently skill intensive with respect to assembly that offshoring increases a 
firm’s sales (in panel A) so as to more than offset the loss of domestic skilled labor entailed by 
delocation of assembly. 
Panels B and D of Figure 2 relate the level of sales (on their and panel A’s vertical axis) 
  14to skilled and unskilled employment levels, respectively. In panel D, the ratio of (higher) sales to 
(lower) unskilled employment levels is much larger for offshoring firms. In panel C, sales per 
skilled domestic worker are actually smaller when production is offshored, and are not nearly as 
different across offshoring and non-offshoring firms: as both of these perform domestically the 
activities that employ most of their skilled workers, the relationship between sales and skilled 




4. Empirical evidence  
The structure of our theoretical offshoring model is inspired by the descriptive statistics of 
Section 2, as well as by recent advances in modeling of related phenomena, and is therefore by 
construction compatible with some key empirical features. In the data, offshoring firms are 
larger, have larger sales/employment and value added/employment ratios, and employ a larger 
share of skilled workers in their domestic operations, especially when offshored production 
includes intermediate products to be re-imported and assembled, rather than finished products 
only.  In the model laid out in Section 3, offshoring is motivated by cost savings rather than 
output market proximity and, since a portion of variable production activities remains domestic, 
offshoring firms may be larger in terms of overall domestic employment, and should employ 
more skilled and less unskilled workers than non-offshoring firms. 
To assess the empirical fit of the model along less obvious dimensions, we first revisit the 
empirical relationship between sales and employment (of different skill levels) in a graphical 
format similar to that we have used to illustrate theoretical insights.  Figure 3 displays descriptive 
regressions aimed at assessing the fit between our data and theoretical perspective. As shown in 
Figures 1.B, 2.B, and 2.D, firm sales and employment should be linearly related when the 
variation across observations is driven only by the firms’ competitiveness indicator, ai. In reality, 
the relationship is of course affected by other unobservable heterogeneity, and a log-linear 
relationship fits the data much better. The plots of actual and predicted sales as functions of 
employment in Figure 3 are qualitatively consistent with their theoretical counterparts in Figures 
                                                 
10 This paper’s model focuses on marginal labor costs and disregards the labor content of fixed costs, which is likely 
to consist predominantly of relatively skilled workers. The implications of offshoring for the composition of 
domestic ‘headquarters’ employment would be qualitatively similar to those we analyze explicitly. 
  151 and 2. Offshoring firms (marked by circles) visibly tend to be larger in terms of sales than non-
offshoring firms (marked by dots). There is much more overlap across the distributions along the 
(horizontal) employment dimension. The effect of offshoring on the slope of the 
sales/employment relationship is positive, and much more pronounced for blue collars than for 
white collars: regressing sales on white collar employment and its interaction with the offshoring 
dummy indicates that, as suggested by Figure 2.B, the sales/skilled labor relationship is not very 
significantly affected by whether the firm offshored (unskilled-intensive) production activities.  
The model of Section 3 explains in terms of fixed costs’ relevance Section 2’s descriptive 
evidence of offshoring choice discreteness and of (employment, sales, and value added) size 
differentials across offshoring and non-offshoring firms, that in the model reflect the role of 
firm-level competitiveness in determining how easily marginal cost savings may offset the fixed 
cost of organizing foreign production. The model also features a novel role for different skill 
intensity of the activities that may or may not be offshored, and can explain differences across 
the two groups of firms in terms of employment composition. In what follows, we assess the 
statistical significance of these patterns, and attempt to provide more structural evidence of the 
model's fit, by specifying and estimating formal models that, unlike graphical illustrations, make 
it possible to controlling for observable heterogeneity across sectors an geographical location. To 
characterize the relationship between offshoring and migration, we estimate a system of two 
equations. The first one relates the (endogenous) offshoring outcome to other observable firm-
level characteristics, and the second relates (instrumented) offshoring information to the structure 
of firms’ employment.   
 
4.1 Determinants of offshoring decisions 
The fit between theory and evidence is qualitatively intriguing but, of course, far from perfect. In 
Figures 1 and 2 the distribution of intrinsic efficiency was assumed to be lognormal and only a 
modest amount of uncorrelated noise was added to artificial data. The distribution of sales and 
employment in the real data in Figure 3 is much more strongly skewed and, unsurprisingly, much 
noisier than the model illustrations. Our theoretical framework itself suggests reasons why this is 
the case, and ways in which noise may be reduced by controlled regression techniques.  
  16In the theoretical model, the chief determinant of a firm’s decision to offshore is its 
intrinsic ‘competitiveness’, indexed by the firm-specific   variable in the model. As Figures 1 
and 2 make clear, this variable jointly determines the volume of sales, the size and composition 
of employment, and offshoring decisions. In practice, ‘competitiveness’ is not directly 
observable. It might in principle be estimated by standard production function methods, which 
however would be particularly problematic from a theoretical perspective where the factor 
intensity of production in domestic plants is naturally different across offshoring and non-
offshoring firms. In fact, simple descriptive regressions that control for capital and intermediate 
inputs confirm the broad message of the regressions displayed in Figure 3, as regards the 
relationship between offshoring and the elasticities to blue and white collar employment. To 
account for production function heterogeneity across offshoring and non-offshoring firms, 
observable variables relevant to that choice could be used to endogenize selection of firms into 
different technologies, and improve estimation of production function parameters and TFP 
residuals. Estimating structural production functions would remain problematic on cross-
sectional data, however, since simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity would still be 
worrisome sources of bias for the resulting productivity indicators. In light of these problems, we 
choose to report results based on an admittedly simple minded approach to TFP estimation, 
controlling only for capital intensity on all data pooled in cross-section.  
i a
For our main purpose of detecting linkages between internationalization of production 
and domestic employment, we adopt the semi-structural approach of instrumenting the 
offshoring dummy with variables that plausibly drive offshoring but, for given offshoring, do not 
directly influence the composition of employment. In reality sales, employment, and offshoring 
depend on many more firm characteristics than just intrinsic efficiency. While the theoretical 
illustrations in Figures 1 and 2 kept those constant across firms, they are likely to vary across 
sectors and local labor markets in the data. To some extent this heterogeneity may be controlled 
by industry and geographical dummies. Moreover, it is possible to use the survey’s information 
to try and control for additional dimensions heterogeneity that may select firms into the 
offshoring mode of operation.  
At the firm level, for given competitiveness and given market conditions, the choice 
between offshored and domestic immigrant-intensive production may be driven by heterogeneity 
of the fixed costs of offshoring (as indexed by mi in the model of Section 3). Some of the 
  17relevant variation may be observable, at least in principle: firms located near airports, or firms 
whose managers’ previous career includes overseas postings, might well find it easier to set up 
and control offshore production facilities. These and other organizational features, however, can 
hardly be viewed as completely exogenous, since a firm that finds the offshoring option 
attractive for unobservable reasons might well choose its location or managers so as to make that 
convenient. Moreover, our data do not include location information beyond the provincial 
dummies that we include in our specifications to control for a myriad of phenomena, nor do the 
data offer information about the previous career or linguistic skills of managers. 
The data do include survey questions meant to single out family firms: we know whether 
members of the owner’s family are senior managers, and whether firms employ managers who 
are not members of the family. This information can arguably provide instruments for the 
purpose of detecting the implications offshoring decisions. It is hard to see how exploiting 
international production opportunities could have causal effects on the aspects of manager 
selection that reflect family histories and demographic developments (in our data, non-family 
managers are significantly and increasingly likely to be employed by older firms). But the 
presence of family and non-family managers arguably can affect a firm’s propensity to offshore 
production, because less diversified family owners may well be more reluctant to risk and 
innovate than the managers of public firms,
11 and will affect offshoring costs if external 
managers are more likely than the entrepreneurs’ offspring to have relevant skills.   
Formally, let the offshoring   outcome be observed if a latent variable  , 
while    otherwise. We consider specifications for the latent variable in the form 
1 = i OS 0 ≥
∗
i OS
0 = i OS
( )   = i i i X g OS ε α +
∗ ,                                                          (5) 
where   is a suitable function of a set of firm-level variables.  ) ( i X g
The first and third columns of Table 4 report the results of the estimation of reduced form 
probit models for offshoring outcomes that specify  ( ) i Y g  as a linear function of the TFP proxy 
for productivity, computed as the residual from the cross-sectional estimation of a two-factor 
Cobb-Douglas accounting for capital intensity and augmented with province and (2-digit NACE) 
industry dummies, to control for production-function and wage-driven relationships between 
                                                 
11 Tucci, Barba Navaretti and Faini (2006) discuss how risk aversion in family firms may increase the perceived cost 
of carrying out risky foreign operations. 
  18firms’ production and sales. Like the less formal evidence reported in Table 2 above, these 
regressions indicate that offshoring is rather tightly related to productivity proxies in our data.  
The other two columns of Table 4 specify   as a linear function of the arguably 
relevant determinants of offshoring decisions introduced above, namely the presence of family 
members and of others in the firms’ top management. The explanatory power of these 
organizational indicators is also very high: the significantly negative coefficient of the FF 
dummy indicates that the presence of a family member reduces the management’s propensity to 
offshore production, while the presence of external managers has the opposite effect. The two 
indicators are imperfectly correlated in our data: about a fifth of firms report employment of a 
single manager (and about one out of eight reports zero managers), but while the number and the 
share of external managers is positively related to the size of the firm, firms of all sizes may or 
may not employ non-family managers: among the firms that employ a single manager, for 
example, about a fifth report that the person is not a member of the owner’s family (or the owner 
herself). 
) ( i X g
 
4.2 Offshoring, skill intensity, and immigrant employment 
This evidence reported in the previous subsection is consistent with our theoretical model’s focus 
on offshoring decisions driven (at a given market wage) by firm-level competitiveness and/or by 
determinants of offshoring costs.  In the model, offshoring in turn affects the skill composition of 
employment, in that the activities which remain in the domestic country have higher skill 
requirements than those that may be performed abroad. To assess the realism of this implication 
we run regression in the form 











1 = β                                                  (6)   
where the dependent variable may be the ratio of skilled to total employees, or the ratio of 
foreign employees to total employment, in the domestic operations of surveyed firms. On the 
right hand side, the coefficient  1 β  measures the relevance of offshoring in those respects.  
If a single exogenous ‘competitiveness’ characteristic determined all aspects of firm 
heterogeneity, the offshoring indicator   would be uniquely determined by firm-level 
efficiency. As mentioned, however, more than one dimension of relevant heterogeneity 
i OS
  19determines offshoring and employment in reality. The parameter of interest  1 β  can be estimated 
consistently by OLS only if the unobservable determinants relegated to the error terms of (5) and 
(6) are not correlated,  0 = ) ( i i E ν ε . This however rules out the plausible possibility that 
unobserved firm characteristics may jointly affect the skill structure and nationality of the 
workforce and management’s inclination to offshore. If, for example, entrepreneurs who 
discriminate against immigrant workers also like to internationalize their activities, 
then 0 ) ( < i iv E ε  and the OLS estimates of  1 β  will be biased downwards. More generally, the 
bias will depend on the correlation between the unobservables in (5) and (6).   
To try and disentangle structural mechanisms from such spurious relationships, we 
estimate (6) by instrumental variables (IV), using the predicted propensity to offshore   from 
the reduced-form relationship (5) to instrument the observed offshoring outcome.
*
i OS
12 Table 5 
reports the results of OLS and IV regressions of the share of white collar employees on observed 
offshoring (OLS) and on instrumented offshoring (IV), using province and industry dummies to 
control for the effects of technological differences in the skill intensity of production activities 
and of locally determined wages.
13  
The positive sign of the coefficients is consistent with our theoretical perspective: if 
within each sector and province the production stages that may be offshored are low-skill 
intensive, firms that do offshore for the reasons we model should employ a larger share of high-
skill workers. This is the case in all specifications, and the effect is stronger when estimated on 
the ‘restricted’ sample of firms that we expect to conform more closely to our theoretical 
perspective. The coefficients are larger when estimated by IV, indicating that unobservable 
reasons why a specific firm decides to offshore may indeed be related to the skill composition of 
its employment in ways that bias the OLS estimates towards zero.  
The TFP-based IV estimates are implausibly large and rather imprecisely estimated. This 
may indicate that accounting capital stock information is too imprecise to allow estimation of 
production functions on cross-sectional data. The a priori more reliable identification strategy 
                                                 
12 While the data do not deny the relevance of our productivity-based explanation to individual firms’ offshoring 
decisions, it is of course impossible to rule out uncontrolled endogeneity bias. Egger and Egger (2003) use a 
formally similar approach to industry-level data, and model heterogeneity in terms of offshoring costs and incentives 
proxied by variables excluded from the determinants of employment’s skill intensity.  
13 We report results of linear regressions. Specifications that account for the limited range of the dependent variable 
yield essentially identical results. 
  20based on firm-specific organizational characteristics indeed yields smaller (if still quite large and 
highly significant) estimates for the response to offshoring decisions of the white collar 
component of employment.
14
Recall that the descriptive statistics of Section 2 found immigrant employment to be 
negatively related to offshoring activity. The theoretical model of Section 3 only distinguished 
workers according to their skill, not to their national origin. If, at a given level of skill, 
immigrants are perfect substitutes for native workers, firms should be indifferent between hiring 
either, at a given market wage. This does not however deny that a relationship may be observed 
between offshoring and immigrant employment at the firm level, because within each firm’s 
hiring pool the proportion of unskilled workers may differ across the immigrant and domestic 
components: if an unskilled worker is more likely to be immigrant than a skilled worker, the 
higher skill requirements of offshoring firms implies that immigrants should be a smaller fraction 
of their domestic employment.  
In what follows we run regressions, controlling for (rough) firm-level skill indicators, 
meant to assess whether this simple statistical mechanism or more structural relationships 
underlie the observed correlation. Table 6 reports estimates of regressions in the form (6) with 
the share of immigrants as the dependent variable. If the reason why offshoring is related to 
immigrant employment is that unskilled workers are more likely than skilled workers to be 
immigrant, we expect a negative sign. This is the case in both OLS and IV estimates, again more 
strongly when the sample is restricted to firms that are more likely motivated by our theoretical 
model’s mechanisms. All the IV coefficients are larger in absolute value, and similar across the 
different sets of instrumental variables. Evidence of downward bias in OLS coefficients again 
indicates that the unobservable (and unrelated to TFP and organizational instruments) component 
of what determines decisions to offshoring choices is negatively related, at the firm level, to the 
unpredictable inclination to hire immigrants (in simple words, entrepreneurs who for some 
reason prefer to outsource their activities abroad also, for equally unexplainable reasons, prefer 
                                                 
14 Other productivity proxies, with additional controls or without attempting to account for capital, yield 
qualitatively similar results. When using as IVs firm-level investments in telecommunication (TLC) equipment, we 
have obtained reasonably plausible results (a point estimate around 0.2 for the offshoring dummy), which are 
however not easy to interpret. While efficient communications are arguably related to offshoring decisions, and TLC 
investments are less likely than more general technological investments (such as PCs) to directly affect the skill 
structure of the firm’s domestic operations, they are likely to be jointly endogenous to production offshoring 
decisions. 
  21not to hire foreign workers).  
We consider next whether and how the mix of skills across the pools of migrant and 
domestic workers is different in ways that are not captured by our rough measures of the skill 
composition of the work force. To assess the extent to which offshoring and the resulting skill 
intensity of domestic activities account for the national origin of each firm’s employees, we 
estimate regressions relating the share of migrant workers to the share of skilled workers as well 






















3 2 = β β ,                                              (7) 
where we again instrument the offshoring dummy with its predicted probability from estimation 
of (5). If both  2 β  and  3, β  turn out to be significant, then offshoring affects the share of migrant 
workers both directly, and indirectly through the share of skilled workers. This is an indication 
that immigrants, as a group, are less well endowed with the skills that are used intensely in the 
domestic activities of offshoring firms. For example, if foreign white-collar workers lack the 
language and communication skills needed for coordination and quality control activities, the 
offshoring dummy can have a direct effect on the share of migrant workers, rather than only an 
indirect effect through the share of white-collar workers engaged in those and other activities. 
The results are reported in Table 7. The offshoring dummy is significantly and negatively 
associated with the share of immigrants, both in OLS and in IV estimation. The IV estimates are 
again larger than OLS ones (but the coefficient is not significant when TFP is the instrument), 
and the estimated relationships are stronger when offshoring is defined in the more theoretically 
suitable “restricted” way.  
Even after controlling for offshoring, there is strong evidence of a relationship between 
the skill composition of each firm’s employment (as measured, albeit imperfectly, by the share of 
white collar workers) and the incidence of immigrant worker employment. This indicates that 
offshoring does on average substitute for immigrant employment.  The skills of typical 
immigrants, on a finer scale than that of the available white vs. blue collar distinction, are likely 
to be different from those of typical native workers.  If immigrants’ characteristics are less useful 
in the stages of production that must be performed onshore then, independently from the white 
vs. blue collar skill structure of the firm’s employment, offshoring is negatively related to the 
share of immigrants in domestic operations.  
  22 
5 Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper has explored the relationship between offshoring of production and employment of 
local, possibly immigrant workers. Aiming to characterize how firm-level mechanisms may 
induce positive or negative covariation between the two phenomena, we have focused on 
heterogeneous firms’ profit-maximizing discrete choice of whether to offshore production. Our 
theoretical framework, inspired by recently developed modeling approaches, delivers intuitive 
implications for the amount and skill composition of domestic employment. Bringing these 
implications to bear on a large sample of Italian firms, we estimate economically sizable and 
statistically significant relationships between firms’ characteristics and offshoring decisions. We 
find that the tendency of offshoring firms to employ a larger share of skilled workers only partly 
explains their lower share of immigrant employees.  
These results offer indications of sensible and economically relevant tradeoffs between 
various means of ensuring viability of manufacturing industries in Italy. In a high-wage country, 
manufacturing firms should either be more ‘competitive’ (in terms of disembodied productivity 
or product market strength), or outsource production to countries where labor is cheaper, or hire 
similarly productive immigrant workers locally. Italy has seen a recent surge of external 
immigration flows and re-location of production to cheap labor countries. Both patterns have 
been and will be important in preserving (to some extent) the country’s manufacturing 
competitiveness. Immigration can provide a suitable local supply of labor, and fragmentation of 
production and relocation to cheap labor countries can give firms sufficient competitive leeway 
to preserve part of their activities in Italy. Immigration and competitiveness are both influenced 
by a large and separate set of policies and institutions, whose implications should be evaluated 
jointly if, as we argue theoretically and show empirically, offshoring and employment of 
immigrants are intimately related along several possible dimensions.  
Our approach and findings therefore may have important policy implications, and open 
promising directions of further research. In our model, the implications of offshoring for factor-
income distribution and for efficiency are similar to those of other forms of economic integration 
driven by wage and factor endowment heterogeneity. Offshoring depresses domestic 
employment opportunities for unskilled workers relative to those of skilled workers. As 
suggested by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), offshoring can however foster overall 
  23employment creation through its productivity-enhancing effects. Allowing easier immigration 
can reduce incentives to offshore production to cheap labor countries, while immigration 
pressure can be increased by policy actions meant to reduce the incidence of offshoring.
15 Less 
intuitively, policies that improve domestic firms’ competitiveness can increase the incidence of 
offshoring, since a stronger market position makes it easier for firms to overcome fixed 
organizational costs and exploit foreign locations’ lower marginal costs.  
In order to flesh out these and other policy implications, further research should proceed to 
bring our theoretical and empirical results to bear on aggregate evidence of the type displayed in 
Table 3. Embedding our firm-level theoretical relationships in structural models of local labor 
markets, focusing in particular on a fuller analysis of relationships between the skill level and 
national origin of workers, will make it possible to assess how heterogeneity not only across 
firms, but also across provinces and sectors may bear on the extent to which immigration may 
bid down the wages of substitutable native workers with equivalent skills, and affect incentives 
to offshore production.  
                                                 
15 For example, in May 2005 the European Parliament’s Regional Development Committee expressed strong support 
for a European Commission proposal to impose financial penalties on recipients of received EU funding that decide 
to relocate their activities. The Committee also asked for legal measures to ensure that firms receiving European 
subsidies do not relocate for a “long and predetermined” period. 
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Data Appendix 
Sample selection  
The 2004 release of the Capitalia survey includes information on a sample of 4289 Italian manufacturing 
firms. All firms with more than 500 employees are included whereas firms with less than 500 employees 
are selected with a stratified sampling method. We removed from the sample firms with missing or non-
manufacturing activity codes. Furthermore, we removed those with missing values on balance sheet data, 
on work force composition (question B1.1) and on offshoring activities (question D3.1). Finally, we also 
excluded firms with TFP  below the 0.5 or above the 99.5 percentiles of the overall distribution. Our final 
sample is made up of 3280 observations. Table A.1 reports the distribution of firms by size-classes before 
and after our cleaning procedures.  
 
Table A.1. Employment distribution before and after the cleaning, % 
   Before  After 
11-20 22.15  21.80 
21-50 29.54  31.31 
51-250 36.93 38.90 
251-499 5.27 4.63 
≥500 6.11  3.35 
 
Variable Definitions  
Offshoring Dummy (OS): In the questionnaire (question D3.1) each firm is asked to answer whether it 
currently performs a portion of its manufacturing activities in another country. Our dummy is set equal to 
1 is the answer is yes and 0 otherwise. 
Number of employees (L): average number of employees (question B1.1.6) over the three year period. 
Sales, value added, fixed capital (Q, Y, K): three-year average of balance sheet entries.   
Share of white collar workers (LW/L): ratio of white collar employees (B1.1.1+B1.1.2 + B1.1.2.2 + 
B1.1.3 + B1.1.4) to total employment (B1.1.6) 
Share of extra-EU workers (LW/L): ratio of extra-EU workers (B1.1.6.4) to total employment (B1.1.6). 
Industry Dummies: these take the value 1 (zero otherwise) for firms whose main production activity is 
in each of  21 NACE two-digit industries (15+16 - food, beverages and tobacco; 17 - textiles; 18 - 
clothing; 19 - leather; 20 - wood; 21 - paper products; 22 - printing and publishing; 23 - oil refining; 24 - 
chemicals; 25 - rubber and plastics; 26 - non-metal minerals; 27 - metals; 28 - metal products; 29 - non-
electric machinery; 30 - office equipment and computers; 31 - electric machinery; 32 - electronic material, 
measuring and communication tools, TV and radio; 33 - medical apparels and instruments; 34 - vehicles; 
35 - other transportation; 36 - furniture).  
Provincial Dummies: these take the value 1 (zero otherwise) if the administrative headquarters of the 
firm is located in each of the 103 provinces of Italy in the 2001-03 period. 
EM dummy: takes the value 1 if the firm has external senior managers (35.3% in the full 
sample), zero otherwise.  
FF dummy: takes the value 1 if the owner or a member of her family has a senior management 
position in the firm (70.5% in the full sample), zero otherwise. 
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  28Table 1. Descriptive Statistics, all firms 
 Mean  Std.dev.  1stQ  Median  3rdQ 
Sales (Q)  24.8  78.7  4.9  9.5  19.8 
Value added (Y)  6.1  18.1  1.0  2.3  4.8 
Employees (L)  106.5  258.5  28.0  46.6  96.0 
Sales/Employees  (Q/L)  0.244 0.225  0.125 0.185 0.289 
Value added/Employees (Y/L)  0.052  0.026  0.017  0.047  0.061 
Share of white collar workers (Lw  /L)  0.325  0.181  0.202  0.286  0.405 
Share of extra-EU workers (LE  /L)  0.038  0.080  0.000  0.000  0.043 
 
Note: All statistics are computed for 2001-03 unweighted average data on the full sample of 3280 firms. Sales, 
value added, and their ratios to employment are measured in millions of euro. 
 
 











Observations 3033  247  124 
Sales (Q)  21.9  60.5  63.6 
Value added (Y)  5.4  15.0  14.6 
Employees (L)  94.1  258.4  269.7 
Sales/Employees (Q/L)  0.241  0.279  0.319 
Value added/Employees (Y/L)  0.052  0.053  0.055 
White collar workers (Lw  /L)   0.322  0.376  0.412 
Extra-EU workers (LE  /L)   0.039  0.026  0.016 
 
Note: All statistics are computed for 2001-03 unweighted average data. Sales, value added and their ratios to 
employment are in millions of euro. The restricted sample of offshoring firms excludes firms that declare both to 
offshore only the production of finished products (question D3.2.1) and not to re-import the offshored production 
(question D3.2.5). Source: Authors’ elaboration of Capitalia data. 
  29 
Table 3. Correlation with Provincial Employment Structure 
Observations Fullsample Restr. sample Fullsample Restr. sample
EstimationMethod Probit Probit OLS OLS
Dependent variable OS OS LE/L LE/L
Share ofprovincialempl. inman. 0.859(0.41) 0.676(0.41) 0.191(0.03) 0.196(0.03)
Pseudo R2 0.003 0.002
R2 0.040 0.042
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: Dependent variables computed from Capitalia data; 
independent variable, author’s computation on ISTAT Censimento 2001 data. 
 
 
Table 4: Reduced form probit model for offshoring  
 
Observations Fullsample Fullsample Restr. sample Restr. sample
Estimationmethod Probit Probit Probit Probit
Dependent variable OS OS OS OS
TFP 0.131(0.067) 0.179(0.093)
Family Firm(FF) Dummy -0.146(0.082) -0.278(0.099)
ExternalManager (EM) Dummy 0.660(0.080) 0.593(0.098)
Industrydummies [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Provincialdummies [0.12] [0.11] [0.36] [0.27]
Pseudo R2 0.146 0.192 0.162 0.207
OS  0 correct predictions 0.996 0.992 0.998 0.996
OS  1 correct predictions 0.057 0.089 0.048 0.064  
 
Note: Robust standard errors in round brackets. P-values of the null that each set of coefficients is equal to 0 in 
square brackets. The number of observations used is smaller than original sample sizes since offshoring is predicted 
perfectly by province dummy in all provinces where all firms have no offshoring activities. TFP is computed as the 
residual from the cross-sectional estimation of a two-factor Cobb-Douglas augmented with industry and provincial 
dummies. The FF dummy variable equals 1 if the owner or a member of her family has a senior management 
position in the firm (70.5% in the full sample) and zero otherwise. The EM dummy variable equals 1 if the firm has  
external senior managers (35.3% in the full sample) and zero otherwise.
 
  30 
Table 5: Models for the skill composition of the labor force 
Full sample
Observations 3280 2758 2758
Estimation method OLS IV (TFP)
IV
(FF and EM)
Offshoring (OS) 0.053(0.013) 0.656(0.177) 0.404(0.122)
Industrydummies [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Provincialdummies [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Restricetdsample
Observations 3157 2474 2474
Estimation method OLS IV (TFP)
IV
(FF and EM)
Offshoring (OS) 0.087(0.019) 1.186(0.412) 0.705(0.177)
Industrydummies [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Provincialdummies [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]  
 
Note: See Table 4. The prediction from the offshoring equations in Table 4 are used as instrument for the offshoring 
dummy in IV estimates.
  31  32
Full sample
Observations 3280 2758 2758
Estimation method OLS IV (TFP)
IV
(FF and EM)
Offshoring (OS) -0.014(0.004) -0.080(0.050) -0.106(0.026)
Industrydummies [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Provincialdummies [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Restricetdsample







Table 6: Models for the share of Extra-EU workers 
Estimation method OLS IV (TFP)
(F
Offshoring (OS) -0.022(0.004) -0.154(0.067) -0
Industrydummies [0.00] [0.00]
Provincialdummies [0.00] [0.00]  
 
 
Note: See Table 4. The predictions from the offshoring equation in Table 4 
                             are used as instruments for the offshoring dummy in IV estimates 
 
 Table 7: Models for the share of Extra-EU workers  
Full sample
Observations 3280 2758 2758 3280 2758 2758






Offshoring (OS) -0.011(0.003) -0.043(0.052) -0.092(0.026) -0.011(0.004) -0.046(0.054) -0.096(0.027)
White collar workers (LW/L) -0.054(0.007) -0.056(0.010) -0.049(0.009)
Industry dummies [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Provincialdummies [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Constancy test for (LW/L) [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Restricetdsample
Observations 3157 2474 2474 3157 2474 2474






Offshoring (OS) -0.017(0.004) -0.098(0.064) -0.132(0.045) -0.017(0.004) -0.116(0.069) -0.145(0.046)
White collar workers (LW/L) -0.051(0.007) -0.047(0.012) -0.043(0.011)
Industry dummies [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Provincialdummies [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Constancy test for (LW/L) [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
 
 
Note: See Table 4. The predictions from the offshoring equation in Table 4 are used as instruments for the offshoring dummy in IV estimates. The last three 
columns allow the coefficient of the white-collar employment share to vary across industries: the point estimates are not reported; the null hypothesis of 
constancy across industries of that coefficient is strongly rejected by the data.  
 
FIGURE 1: Illustration of the model’s implications for the joint distribution across firms of 
exogenous strength ( a ), sales, domestic employment, and offshoring. The program that plots 
these figures use the following parameter set: α =0.1, γ =0.66, σ =1.5;  G=10, A=1; 
= 2;  =0.4 ,  =0.3   =0.5, .=0.1.  The firm-level productivity indicators 
are a sample of 275 independent draws from a lognormal distribution with log mean 0.8 and log 
standard deviation 0.3, whose density is plotted in panels A and C (for illustrative purposes, not 
to scale).  
) 0 ( ) 1 ( f f − sd w ud w sf w uf w
  
FIGURE 2: Illustration of the model’s implications for the joint distribution across firms of 
exogenous strength ( a ), sales, domestic skilled and unskilled employment, and offshoring. The 
parameter values are the same as in Figure 1. 
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FIGURE 3: Plots of firm-level sales and employment data, logarithmic scale. Circles represent offshoring firms, 
dots represent non-offshoring firms. The lines plot predicted values from linear regressions where the slope is 
allowed to depend on whether the firm is offshoring some production: coefficients (standard deviations) of the 
offshoring=1 slope interactions are .028 (.008) for total employment, .079 (.010) for blue collar employment, .035 
(.010) for white collar employment. 
  36